First, one of the principal theoretical problems concerning closed timelike lines is that of distinguishing merely counterintuitive effects from downright unphysical ones, but chronology-violating spacetimes (i.e. , spacetimes containing closed timelike lines) tend also to have other unfamiliar features such as "wormholes" and singularities. These may or may not persist when quantum gravity is taken into account. And they introduce technical and conceptual problems of their own which make it difficult to be confident that a particular spacetime model correctly represents the effects that chronology violation would have if it actually occurred.
The second, more profound deficiency is that classical spacetime models do not take account of quantum mechanics which, even aside from any effects of quantum gravity, actually dominates both microscopic and macroscopic physics on and near all closed timelike lines.
My approach will be through the quantum theory of computation (see Refs. [6, 7] [7] , which is computationally universal in the sense that such networks can simulate the behavior of any finite quantum system. Allowing the networks to have temporal as well as spatial loops can be expected to extend the universality in the appropriate way. Second, for any quantum cornputational network there is a spacetime such that the trajectories of particles through the network can be identified with a set of correspondingly connected and aligned timelike world-line segments of the spacetime. One must be careful to distinguish purely spatial diagrams such as Fig. 1(a) from spacetime diagrams such as Fig. 1(b) . Figure 2 shows how two trivial quantum computational networks, namely a spatial loop and a closed timelike loop, are represented in spatial and spacetime diagrams.
The basic method of this paper is to regard computations as representative physical processes -representing the behavior of general physical systems under the unfamiliar circumstances of chronology violation. Computations are usually performed with the intention of creating an output that has certain desired properties depending on an input. But we are interested in Fig. 3 (the meanings of p, and p2 will be given below).
Sometimes it is more illuminating to stop short of transforming the network fully into the form of Fig. 3 , and to allow some of the input and output carriers to be among those that travel back in time. For example, the fully transformed version of the network in Fig. 1 [9) .
Suppose that a single carrier travels along the world line in Fig. 1 In the terms of our model, the fact that (4) is a contradiction implies that the bit does not enter the gate, so our decision to treat the motion of the bit's carrier as given turns out to be unsustainable if the interaction is (3).
Paradox 3
Particles whose trajectories are changed by forces acting on them can be simulated in a computational network model by using an "occupation number" representation.
Consider two-possible trajectories of a particle through the chronology-violating region, the right-hand one going back in time and the left-hand one merely passing by. This is simulated by the network shown in Fig. 4 In terms of the simulated system this says that if the younger version of the particle meets the older version it changes course from either of its two possible trajectories to the other, but if it does not meet the older version it does not change course. This time the kinematical consistency condition is x+y+1=y (6) which implies that x =1; i.e. , the particle must start on the left trajectory and cannot go back in time.
Under this classical analysis the logic of paradox 3 is the same as that of paradox 1. Because we are using the network of Fig. 4 (5) becomes interaction (1) , and condition (6) becomes condition (2 It is a fundamental principle of the philosophy of science [10, 11] that the solutions of problems do not spring fully formed into the Universe, i.e. , as initial data, but emerge only through evolutionary [12] or rational processes. In adopting this evolutionary principle we reject such antirational doctrines as creationism, and more generally we reject all explanations of complex regularity in the observed Universe that attribute it to complex regularity in the initial data.
That one rules out certain logically and empirically possible initial data for philosophical reasons is in no way paradoxical or improper. We do precisely that for the initial data at the big bang, even though any number of cosmologies consistent with observation but violating the evolutionary principle can be constructed [13] . Attempts have been made to codify the conjecture that the initial data for the Universe are very simple (e.g. , Ref. [14] ),and similarly for naked singularities [15] . These may be seen in part as attempts to implement the evolutionary principle.
Paradox 4 is that in the presence of chronology violations the evolutionary principle can convict with the requirement that the evolution be kinematically consistent.
Consider the 2n-bit gate Gf in the network shown in Fig.  5 (10) The density operator of the two bits as they leave the gate 1s
Kinematical consistency now implies that the density operator of the younger bit as it leaves the gate is the same as that of the older bit as it enters the gate, for those bits are one and the same, i.e. , (12) where the trace is over the subspace of states of the older bit.
Unlike its classical analogue (2), the condition (12) has solutions for all initial states I g), including the classically forbidden one litj) = 1). A little algebra shows that if U is given by (10), p=-,
is a solution of (12) for general I P). For lit ) = Io) a family of additional solutions exists, which I shall discuss below. From (10), (11) , and (13) (21) where "e" indicates the position of the operand of the superscattering operator, so it remains to be proved that every operator of the form (16) has a fixed point.
Let p(0) be any density operator on &2, and for each
Each p(N) is the mean of N + 1 density operators, and is therefore itself a density operator on &z. Since
Paradox 2 It can be shown by the same method that under the interaction (3) (22) The probability that there will be exactly one particle in the output is zero, whereas in the classical case it was a certainty that there would be exactly one particle.
Paradox 4
In paradox 4 the kinematical consistency condition in the quantum case is no longer that the value represented by the chronology-violating bits be a fixed point x' of the function f but that the density operator p of those bits The analogue lx'&&x'l of the classical solution is always a solution of (24) , though for most functions f it is not the only one. Let us find the other solutions, in the hope that some of them may satisfy the evolutionary principle. By inspection of (25) , every solution of (24) (22) is p= -, '1, and that makes the density operator of the two output bits '(loo&&ool+111&&111) . (23) -(lo&+ l1 &) 2 (20) p= g p"lx&&xl (26) to the maximally mixed state -2'1. The final state, regardless of A, is equal ,to the initial state l P &.
Paradox 3
The traditional paradox 3 is again similar to paradox-1 under the correspondence (7), but no longer quite equivalent. This time the pure input states that simulate a single particle on one of two trajectories are those in the subspace spanned by the states lo 1 & and l1 0& [18] Substituting (26) and (25) into (24) and comparing coefficients we obtain px= Q py
Iylx =f&y]I if k is the least positive integer such that (29) Df(x)=0 if there is no such positive integer, and f' '(x) is defined as x. Thus any fixed point x' of f has Df(x')=1. For any f there is at least one idempotent value under f.
If f is invertible, (27) implies that p =pf( ) (Vx EZ ") (30) so the kinematical consistency condition (24) amounts to the requirement that p be a sum of terms of the form It is understood here that biological adaptive complexity and similar quantities are forms of "knowledge" and processes such as rational thought are deemed, insofar as they succeed in generating knowledge, to be in a generalized sense "evolutionary. "
Applying this informal version to our present problem, we infer that the supplementary data in a chronologyviolating region must contain no knowledge over and above what was in the initial data on a spacelike hypersurface immediately to the unambiguous past of the region. This is reminiscent of Penrose's "cosmic censorship" hypothesis: although we might be able to see into, the interior of the chronology-violating region, we can see nothing "interesting" there unless it had already been there before or, perhaps, if it had had enough (proper) time to evolve within the region.
I am led to suggest the following maximum entropy rule [19] 
Solutions of (33) still have to have the diagonal form (26) , but now, instead of (27) ,
The solution of (34) order. There can be no y&Z "such that f(y)=xo, so (27) That is not so in the classical case, where the second law can be evaded. Consider, for example, the network of Fig. 1(a) 
Global conservation laws
Without quantum effects global conservation laws go wrong at the transitions between chronology-respecting and chronology-violating regions. A particle whose trajectory is a closed timelike line comes into existence at a certain (externally defined) instant and then ceases to exist at a later (externally defined) instant. If a particle travels to an earlier time at which it had already existed, then for a certain period there will be two versions of the particle present whereas in the unambiguous past and future there is only one. If the particle is a baryon, for instance, this means that the total baryon number of the Universe is first increased and then decreased by one. The same could happen to other conserved quantities, such as charge or energy, that the particle can carry.
Friedman et al. [5] To be sure of creating coexisting copies of both of them, they must ensure that they will both travel on the time machine if and only if neither comes out {it will then not happen that exactly one of them comes out). A third possibility is that while Eve creates a copy of herself in the way just described, Adam travels on the time machine if and only if Eve does come out. Each of them will then be certain of being separated froID the other, having exchanged the other for another version of them-
selves. An external observer will then perceive it to be equally likely that there will be two Adams or two Eves, and impossible that the island will remain unoccupied.
One can speculate what might happen if we one day discover, or create, a closed timelike world tube large and regular enough to accommodate safely the solar system, and we have the means to move the solar system into it. Then we should be in a position to create any number of copies of the solar system. Repeating the process n times would create 2" solar systems, and the process would succeed with subjective certainty for every member of the human race (assuming that they were all on board). The absolute probability that the solar system would still exist afterwards would fall to 2 ", but presumably that would not matter because the probability that any of the inhabitants would be destroyed would be zero.
Perhaps this is the explanation of the fact, which is sometimes considered puzzling ( [29] and Chap. 9 of [28 Only the range, or configuration space, changes as the classical real-valued observables are "promoted" to Hermitian operators. In semiclassical approximations to quantum gravity both the configuration space and the base space change; for example, the topology of the spacetime in which a black hole evaporates cannot be taken to be the same as that of the classical black-hole spacetime. In general, the manifold in which the fields propagate in semiclassical quantum gravity depends on the quantum state and on the interactions to which the fields are subject.
The same effect occurs, for a different reason, when chronology is violated. In the presence of the interactions of paradox 3 in the quantum case the spacetime of Fig. 6 replaces the classical spacetime of Fig. 1(b Fig. 7(a). N I have given no argument in favor of this condition, nor do I believe that it is necessary to do so. As I have said, the quantities that are set equal in equations such as (2) , (4), (6) , (12) , (15) , (22) , (24) , and (33) are in each case simply two ways of describing the same thing. However, Friedman et al. [5] , who impose the same condition, have argued that it is not a triviality but a substantive postulate. I wish to explain why I disagree with them.
They propose a "principle of self consisten-cy" which states that "the only solutions to the laws of physics that can occur locally in the real Universe are those which are globally self consistent "-They argu. e that this principle is "not totally tautological" because a non-self-consistent "solution to the laws of physics" (i.e. , a nonsolution) might be a bone +de solution under some new physical theory -in this case a theory which would give meaning to a "many-valued wave function. " And they say that "if one is inclined from the outset to ignore or disregard the possibility of new physics, then one will regard selfconsistency as a trivial principle.
That is a mistake. The requirement for selfconsistency in scientific argument is a tautology, notwithstanding that is is always possible that future theories will assign meanings to propositions that are meaningless under the existing theory. One must be prepared to contemplate the falsity of any nontautological propostion;
therefore, consider what it would mean to deny the "principle of self-consistency. " An author whose paper is rejected by referees on the grounds that its purported result was self-contradictory could validly object that their criticism contained a tacit assumption of the "principle of self-consistency, " which might be false. Of course it is true than any "contradiction" in the rejected paper could indeed have the same form as a valid implication of a future theory. In the present case, it is undeniably possible that "many-valued wave functions" could be a feature of the successor to quantum theory. Nevertheless it is a tautology, not needing to be postulated separately, that conclusions drawn from existing physics should follow consistently from the postulates of existing physics, and that conclusions drawn from any new theory should follow consistently from the new theory, which must be stated before conclusions can be drawn from it.
Conversely, the speculation that a future theory will allow "many-valued wave functions" does not contradict the "principle of self-consistency" of Friedman et 
